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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PROVO CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 981194-CA

vs.
DAVID G. CANNON,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1992 as Amended).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that Utah Code

Annotated Section 76-5-109 does not require physical impairment
to a child before an individual can be convicted of child abuse?
Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed for
"correctness" with no particular deference accorded to the trial
court.

State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997).

This issue was preserved during argument at trial (R. 41 at
22-24).
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109 is set
forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

David G. Cannon appeals from a conviction of Child Abuse, a
Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section
76-5-109.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court

Cannon was charged by Information with Child Abuse, a Class
B misdemeanor, in Fourth District Court, Provo Department, on or
about January 7, 1997 (R. 1). On January 23, 1998, a bench trial
was held before the Honorable Gary D. Stott, at which Cannon was
convicted of Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor (R. 20, 41). On
March 23, 1998, Cannon was sentenced to 80 days in the Utah
County Jail and ordered to pay a $740.00 fine (R. 26) . The
sentence was stayed pending appeal (Id.).

On March 25, 1998,

Cannon filed a notice of appeal and this action commenced (R.
38) .

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In March of 1996 Cannon and his wife lived in a third floor
apartment located approximately at 401 North 900 East in Provo
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(Tr. at 4-6). Angel Ivins and Penny Cooper also lived in the
same apartment complex on the second floor(Tr. at 4-6, 11-12).
On the afternoon of March 13, 1996, Ivins was standing on
her doorstep and she observed Cannon's wife, Cami, come down to
the second floor to get some mail (Tr. at 6 ) . At this time Ivins
observed Cannon on the third floor approximately fifteen to
twenty feet away (Tr. at 7 ) . Ivins testified that she observed
Cannon holding Christine Armstrong's eight or nine month-old
child over the third story rail (Tr. at 8 ) . Cannon was holding
the child underneath his armpits (Tr. at 9 ) . Ivins testified
that she then heard Cannon's wife tell him to "stop" and Cannon
removed the child from over the rail (Tr. at 9 ) .
On the afternoon of March 13, 1996, Penny Cooper was
likewise standing in front of her second story apartment (Tr. at
13).

Cooper testified that she observed Cannon on the third

floor approximately twenty to twenty-five feet from Cooper (Tr.
at 13). Cooper testified that she also saw Cannon old the baby
over the rail for "just a few minutes" (Tr. at 14). Cooper also
testified that Cannon's wife was standing by her and that when
Cami told Cannon to "stop", he stopped and pulled the baby
towards him (Tr. at 15). Cooper testified that the baby looked
scared(Tr. at 16). Cooper testified that she didn't "know if
[Cannon] thought it was a joke" but that she "just didn't agree
with what [she] saw" (Tr. at 14).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Cannon held a nine month-old child over a third story
railing for a few moments.
physical impairment.

The child received no injuries or

Cannon was convicted of child abuse, a

class A misdemeanor, because the trial court interpreted Utah
Code Annotated Section 76-5-109 to prohibit any act by the
defendant which could conceivably have imperiled the child's
health or welfare.

Cannon asserts that this interpretation is in

error and that the statute requires, at the very least, that the
child's physical condition be impaired by the defendant's
conduct.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 76-5-109 AND THAT
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION RESULTED IN CANNON'S CONVICTION
Cannon was charged with Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109.

At trial

the evidence established that for a few minutes Cannon held a
nine month-old baby over the third story railing of an apartment
complex before being instructed to stop, which he did (Tr. at 49, 13-16).

One witness also testified that the baby looked

scared (Tr. at 16).
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At trial, Cannon argued that he should be acquitted because
the plain language of Section 76-5-109 requires that he must have
inflicted a physical injury upon the baby in order to be
convicted of child abuse (Tr. at 22).

The City argued that

Cannon need only create a condition which "imperils the child's
health or welfare" in order to be guilty of child abuse (Tr. at
22-23) .
The trial court adopted the City's position holding that
"physical injury" can include any condition which could
conceivably imperil the child's health or welfare (Tr. at 24).
Accordingly, because placing the child over the railing could
have imperiled his health or welfare, the trial court convicted
Cannon of child abuse and sentenced to 80 days in jail (Tr. at
24; R. 26).
Cannon asserts that the trial court erroneously interpreted
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109!s requirement of "physical
injury" and that erroneous interpretation resulted in his
conviction.

Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed for

correctness with no deference accorded the trial court.
Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997).

State v.

Moreover, on issues

of statutory construction, this Court should look first to the
"plain language" of the statute.

State v. Winward, 907 P.2d
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1188, 1190 (Utah App. 1995)(citations omitted).

In addition,

"each term in a statute should be interpreted according to its
ususal and commonly accepted meaning."

State v. Paul, 8 60 P.2d

992, 993 (Utah App. 1993).
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109(3) states that "any
person who inflicts upon a child physical injury... is guilty of
an offense as follows: (a) if done intentionally or knowingly,
the offense is a class A misdemeanor; (b) if done recklessly, the
offense is a class B misdemeanor; (c) if done with criminal
negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor."

Therefore,

the requisite statutory elements for child abuse are criminal
intent coupled with the infliction of physical injury upon a
child.
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109(1)(b) defines "physical
injury" as "an injury to or condition of a child which impairs
the physical condition of the child, including: (i) a bruise or
other contusion of the skin; (ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or (iv) any other
condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which
is not a serious physical injury as defined in this section."1
In State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992 (Utah 1993), the defendant,

*An individual who inflicts "serious physical injury" on a
child is guilty of either a second degree felony, third degree
felony, or class A misdemeanor depending upon the requisite
criminal intent. Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109(2).
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while an inmate in the Salt Lake County Jail, allegedly spit on a
correctional officer and was charged with assault on a
correctional officer.

This Court affirmed the trial court's

dismissal of the charge because the statute in question required
that the inmate "throw" material at the officer and the plain
meaning of "throw" does not include spitting.
Similarly, Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109(3) requires
the infliction of a physical injury upon a child prior to a
conviction of child abuse.

Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-

109(1) (b) defines "physical injury" as some injury which "impairs
the physical condition of the child."
Collegiate

Dictionary,

Ninth

Edition

Merriam

Webster's

defines "condition" as "a

state of being" or "a defective state of health" (p. 240); and it
defines "to impair" as "to damage or make worse by" (p. 581).
Cannon asserts that these definitions are the most commonly
accepted meanings of these terms and that this Court should
interpret Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109 accordingly.
The trial court erred, Cannon asserts, in holding that the
plain language of Utah Code Annotated Section 7 6-5-109 did not
require an actual impairment to the child's physical condition
and that any act of the defendant which could have conceivably
affected the child's health or welfare was sufficient to convict
an individual of child abuse.

In this case there was no evidence
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presented at trial which established any physical injury to the
child or any impairment to the physical condition of the child.
Accordingly, Cannon asks that this Court hold that the trial
court's interpretation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109
was in error and that his conviction should be reversed.2
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Cannon asks that this Court reverse his conviction for child
abuse because his conduct did not result in either physical
injury to the child nor was the child's physical condition
impaired by his conduct.
DATED this /

J

day of January, 1999.

•THOMAS H. MEANS
Counsel for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to Rick Romney,
Deputy Provo City Attorney, P.O. Box 1849, Provo, Utah 84603 this
/ /

day of January, 1999.

2

In the alternative, Cannon asks that this Court find that
Cannon's conduct was at most, "reckless" and more probably
"negligent" and that his conviction should be reduced to a class B
or C misdemeanor.
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ADDENDA
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76-5-108

CRIMINAL CODE

(2) Under Subsection (1) any activity as described upon which the initiation,
admission into, affiliation with, or continued membership in an organization is
directly or indirectly conditioned is presumed to be "forced."
(3) An actor who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally hazes another is
guilty of a:
(a) class B misdemeanor if there are no aggravating circumstances;
(b) class A misdemeanor if the act of hazing involves the operation or
other use of a motor vehicle;
(c) third degree felony if the act of hazing involves the use of a deadly or
dangerous weapon;
(d) third degree felony if the hazing results in serious bodily injury to a
person; or
(e) second degree felony if hazing under Subsection (d) involves the use
of a deadly or dangerous weapon.
(4) A person who in good faith reports or participates in reporting of an
alleged hazing is not subject to any civil or criminal liability regarding the
reporting.
History: C. 1953,76-5-107.5, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 59, § 1.

76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another
— Violation.
Any person who has been restrained from abusing or contacting another or
ordered to vacate a dwelling or remain away from the premises of the other's
residence, employment, or other place as ordered by the court under a
protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6,
or Title 78, Chapter 3a, who violates that order after having been properly
served with it, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-108, enacted by L.
1979, ch. I l l , § 10; 1984, ch. 12, § 1; 1991,
ch. 75, § 4; 1993, ch. 137, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "or
contacting another or ordered to vacate a dwelling or remain away from the premises of the
other's residence, employment, or other place

76-5-109.

as ordered by the court under" for "another, or
who has been ordered to vacate a dwelling by,"
inserted "or ex parte protective order," and
made a minor stylistic change,
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993,
substituted "class A misdemeanor" for "class B
misdemeanor."

Child abuse.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a human being who is 17 years of age or less.
(b) "Physical injury" means an injury to tor condition of a child which
impairs] the physical condition of the child, including:
(I) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare
and which is not a serious physical injury as defined in this section.
(c) "Serious physical injury* means any physical injury or set of injuries
which seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical
110
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

76-5-109

torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a
substantial risk of death to the child, including:
(i) fracture of any bone or bones;
illy hazes another j 8 " j
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain,
whether caused by blows, shaking, or causing the child's head to
ing circumstances*
impact with an object or surface;
Ives the operation or n
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those
caused by placing a hot object upon the skin or body of the child;
the use of a deadly or A
(iv) any injury caused by use of a deadly or dangerous weapon;
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the
)us bodily injury to a
same person, either at the same time or on different occasions;
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
i (d) involves the use
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional
harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe impair'*
ment of the child's ability to function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or
;
organ;
*
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if
resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or
^
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or
use of another
;;
malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having
the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows:
L.
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the
k j<. second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree;
< sjf'
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misde*jfo meanor.
* hv (3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care
jor custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury
upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows:
,r:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misde1
; meanor;
h
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor;
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdei meanor.
4
r (4) Criminal actions under this section may be prosecuted in the county or
v: ^district where the offense is alleged to have been committed, where the
' ^existence of the offense is discovered, where the victim resides, or where the
defendant resides.
t>, History: C. 1953, 76-5-109, enacted by L.
£* < 1981, ch. 64, § 1; 1992, ch. 192, § 1.
'V^t Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend&E ment, effective April 27, 1992, subdivided and
^rewrote Subsection (1Kb), substituting the
•,--%fc*lM*8ent language for former similar provisions
" - ? & f ? T t r a n s f erring the rest to Subsection (l)(c); in
^Subsection (l)(c), designated the existing provisions as Subsection (lXcXviii), except for a

reference to "substantial risk of death" now in
the introductory language, and added the rest
of the subsection; in Subsections (2) and (3),
substituted "or" for "and" after "having the
care"; and made stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Child abuse and neglect prevention and treatment, § 62A-4a-301
et seq.
Reporting requirements, § 62A-4a-403.
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT Of UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, PROVO* DEPARTMENT

PROVO CITY,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 971-240

vs.
DAVID G. CANNON,
Defendant.

Trial
Electronically Recorded on
January 23, 1998
BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE GARY P. STOTT
Fourth District Court Judge

For the Plaintiff;

Rick Romney
Deputy County Attorney
100 East Center Street
Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801)370-8026

For the Defendant:

Thomas H. Means
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT &
ESPLIN
43 East 299 North
PO Box "L!l
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: (801)373-4912

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT
CENTER COURT REPORTING
PO BOX 1786
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786
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P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronically recorded on January 23, 1998)
THE COURT: Next item is that of City vs.
Cannon, David Cannon present?
MR. MEANS:

Are you Mr. Cannon?

Your Honor, I'm on that matter,

and I'll be right back in.
THE COURT:

Sure. Are you ready Mr. Means?

MR. MEANS:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Romney?
MR. ROMNEY:
THE COURT:

I believe so, your Honor, yes.
You may go ahead, gentlemen.

MR. ROMNEY:

Thank you, your Honor.

We'll

call Angel Ivins.
COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you are about to give in this case now
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

I do.

ANGEL IVINS
having been first duly sworn,
testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ROMNEY:
Q.

Would you state your name, please, for the

record?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

It's Angel June Ivins.

Q.

What city do you live in?

A.

Provo.

Q.

I'm going to call your attention, ma'am, to

the date of March 13, 1996.

That's a long time ago,

coming up to a couple of years, and ask you if on that
date you lived at 401 North 900 East?
A.

I did.

Q.

Do you still live there?

A.

I sure do.

Q.

And you still live in the same apartment

there that you did then?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What apartment is that?

A.

Twenty.

Q.

Tell us, if you will, that building, how is

it configured, and where you live in the building.
A.

Well, it's kind of like square, kind of, you

know.
Q.

Would it be a U-shaped apartment complex?

A.

Yeah, it's U-shaped, and I'm in the straight

part in the back.
Q.

So you're in the part furthest west on the

U-shape of the complex?
A.

Yes.
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Q.

Where is your apartment, on which of the

levels?
A.

Second floor.

Q.

How many levels are there?

A.

Three.

Q.

Three?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Let me ask you, ma'am, are you acquainted

' with a David Cannon?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Would you recognize that person if he were

here today?
A.

He's there to the left.

Q.

Seated by the attorney at the other table,

1 is he the fellow in the blue shirt?
'

A.

Yes.

Q.

How do you know David Cannon?

A.

He was a neighbor, he lived on the third

floor.
Q.

Does he still live there?

A.

No, he doesn't.

Q.

Are you acquainted with Christine Armstrong?

A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

And her children?

A.

Yes, I am.
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Q.

Let me call your attention, then, to that

2

date we talked about, March 13, 1996, and ask you if

3

on that date you observed Mr. Cannon in company with

4

any of the children of Ms. Armstrong.

5

A.

Yes, I did.

6

Q.

Ma'am, if you will, tell us when that

7
8
9
10

occurred more or less on that day, what you observed.
A.

Well, I was standing outside next to my

door, and Cami was going down -- his wife, I don't
know if they're still married or not.

11

Q.

Cannon's wife?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Was where?

14

A.

She was walking down on my level to go down

15
16
17
18

to get some mail.
Q.

And did you mention where Mr. Cannon lived,

on which level?
A.

He was on the third floor.

I don't remember

19

exactly what apartment number it was, but it was on

20

the third floor.

21
22
23
24
25

Q.

And then you left your apartment and were

standing on the (inaudible)?
A.

I was standing -- I was just like walking

out my door and I was standing on the doorstep there.
Q.

And his wife was on your same level, you
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1

indicated was going to get some mail?

2

A.

Yes, she was going to get some mail.

3

Q.

Did you see Mr. Cannon from where you were

4

located?

5

A.

Yes, I did.

6

Q.

Tell us, if you will, where it was that you

7

saw him.

8

A.

He was on the third floor.

9

Q.

How far away from you in distance would you

10

say, in terms of this courtroom.

11

A.

Maybe 15 feet, 20 feet.

12

Q.

Close?

13

A.

Pretty close.

14

Q.

Did you have obstructions to your ability to

15

see him?

16

A.

No, I didn't.

17

Q.

What did you notice about him?

18
19

Tell us, if

you will, if you remember what time of day it was.
A.

It was like afternoon, mid afternoon. I

20

don't exactly know what time it was because it's been

21

a long time.

22

Q.

Was it still daylight?

23

A.

Yes, it was.

24

Q.

How many people were around you?

25

A.

Well, Penny was outside, and his wife was
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1

outside, and a couple of other witnesses -- I mean

2

another witness that had seen it is not here right

3

now, but she was outside, too.

4

Q.

How many people were around Mr. Cannon?

5

A.

Children were like right next to him.

6

Q.

How many children?

7

A.

Amber and Malcolm.

8

Q.

You've indicated that he lived on the third

9

floor; is that right?

10

A.

Uh-huh.

11

Q.

How far would it be in your estimation in

12
13
14
15

distance from the third floor to the ground?
A.

I'm not really good at estimating.

say at least 15 to 20 feet, it could be more.
Q.

What happened as you looked up and observed

16

Mr. Cannon?

17

A.

18
19
20

I would

He was hanging Malcolm over the rail, and

his wife had said, "No, David, don't. Stop."
Q.

Let me stop you there.

Malcolm, who is

Malcolm?

21

A.

Christine Armstrong's son.

22

Q.

And at that time, ma'am, in March of 1996,

23

how old was Malcolm?

24

A.

I believe eight or nine months.

25

Q.

A little baby?
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A,

Yes.

Q.

You've indicated that Mr. Cannon was hanging

Malcolm over the rail.
mean by that.
A.

Tell us specifically what you

What was he doing with the baby?

He had him underneath his arms, and he was

literally just hanging him over like this.
Q.

What was his wife doing, Cami Cannon, what

did she say?
A.

She said, "No, David, don't.

Stop," like

that.
Q.

What happened next?

A.

I don't really exactly remember.

I think he

brought the baby back from over the rail.
Q.

How long did this take?

How long over what

time period did this occur?
A.

Probably a few minutes.

Q.

What was your response, ma'am, when you

looked up and saw him hanging the baby, Malcolm, over
the rail?
A.

I was really shocked because I wouldn't even

dream of doing something like that.

Just playing

around it would not be something funny, you know.
Q.

What was underneath the baby as he was being

hung out over the railing?
A.

Nothing.
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Q.

What happened then?

A.

He had brought the baby back over the rail,

and I guess they went back into the apartment.
Q.

What did you do then?

A.

I was completely shocked.

Q.

Why?

A.

Because to see something like that.

I mean

if he were to fall, there's no way that baby would
have made it.

I was just totally shocked.

Q.

What happened next?

A.

I had talked with Christine about it when

she came home, and from there I believe she called the
police.
Q.

Did you have further interaction with the

police as to what you had seen that day?
A.

I think I gave them a statement, but I'm not

for sure.
MR. ROMNEY:

That's all the questions that I

have of the witness, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Wait just a moment.

Mr. Means

might have some questions for you.
MR. MEANS: No questions, your Honor.
THE COURT:

All right, thank you, ma'am.

Mr. Romney, your next witness?
MR. ROMNEY:

We call Ms. Cooper, your Honor,
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Penny Cooper.
COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you are about to give in this case now
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

I do.

PENNY COOPER
having been first duly sworn,
testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ROMNEY:
Q.

Ma'am, good morning, would you state your

name, please, for the record?
A.

Penny Lynn Cooper.

Q.

Are you a resident of Provo?

A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

I want to call your attention to the same

date we have talked about with the other witness, that
being the 13th of March of 1996.

Were you a resident

of 401 North 900 East on that date?
A.

Yes, I was.

Q.

Is that the apartment complex that's been

described to us by Ms. Ivins?
A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

U-shaped complex?
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A.

Yes.

Q*

Which apartment did you live in at that

time?
A,

Seventeen.

Q.

Which level is that on?

A.

Second.

Q.

Is that a three level apartment complex?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

In your estimation, ma'am, how far in

distance is it from the top level to the ground?
A.

About 3 0 feet.

Q.

And what separates that level from the

ground, what protective devices, if any?

Is there a

guard rail?
A.

Just a guard rail, yeah.

o.

So you lived on the second floor?

A.

Uh-huh.

Q.

Are you familiar with a David Cannon?

A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

Would you recognize that person if he were

here?
. A,

Yes, I do.

Q.

Is he here?

A.

Yes, he is.

Q.

Point him out, please.
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A

Right there.

Q

Next to Mr. Means in the blue shirt?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

And how are you familiar with him?

A

He lived in our apartment complex.

Q

Which level did he live on?

A

Third floor.

Q

Calling your attention to that date, March

' 13, 19S)6, did you have occasion to observe Mr. Cannon
on that: date?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

Where was he and where were you?

A.

I was in front of my apartment complex next

to the guard rail, and he was up by -- in front of his
apartm<=mt next to the guard rail.
Q.

Which was how far away from you?

A.

On a flat surface it would be about 20 to 25

! feet.
Q.

Did you have anything obscuring your view of

Mr. Cannon or what he was doing?
A.

Huh-uh.

Q.

Describe, if you will, the daylight

conditions and how many people were around, what was
happens.rig.
A.

It was between probably approximately 3:30,
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1

4 o'clock.

2

Q.

Was it daylight?

3

A.

It was still daylight, and there wasn't very

4

many people around.

It was just me and a few children

5

and a couple of adults.

6

Q.

What did you see happen?

7

A.

I seen the person in question hang--

8

Q.

Well, the person in question, who are you

9
10

talking about?
A.

David Cannon, over the railing I seen him

11

hang Malcolm Bailey over the railing by -- underneath

12

his arms in front of his apartment.

13

Q.

How did he do that?

14

A.

Pretty much just picked him up and held him

15

Describe what he did.

like this over the railing.

16

Q.

How long did that take?

17

A.

It was probably just a few minutes.

18

Q.

What was the defendant, Mr. Cannon, doing at

19
20

that time?
A.

I don't know if he thought it was a joke or

21

if -- I don't really know the mental state he was in

22

at the time, but I just didn't agree with what I saw.

23
24
25

Q.
response?
A.

You indicate you didn't agree, what was your
What did you do?
I was in shock, and if it would have been my
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son I probably would have went up there and got the
baby from him.
Q.

Why?

A.

Because I don't think that's right, jokingly

or otherwise.
Q.

What happened then?

A.

His neighbor next to him grabbed the baby

when they came back from the rail and took him into
the apartment.
Q.

The neighbor that took the child--

A.

The witness that isn't here.

Q.

And then what happened?

A.

Cami went upstairs.

when all this was happening.

Cami was standing by me
She had just barely came

from the mailbox.
Q.

So she was by you when you were watching

David?
A

Uh-huh.

Q

Did she see it?

A

Yes, she did.

Q

What happened as she saw it?

A

She said, "David, don't. Stop."

Q

What did he do?

A

He stopped, he pulled the baby back over the

railing towards him.
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Q.

So then what happened next?

A.

I went into my apartment because I just

couldn't believe what I had seen, and that was pretty
much all I saw.
Q.

How old was this baby?

A.

About eight to ten months, and was -- I

don't know if he still is -- a chronic asthma patient.
Q.

Did you know his physical condition at that

time?
A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

What was it?

A.

He looked pretty scared.

I don't know at

the time after he had pulled him over the railing if
he was in shock or not.
MR. ROMNEY:

That's all the questions I have

of the lady, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Means?

MR. MEANS:

No questions.

THE COURT:

Thank you, ma'am.

Anything else, Mr. Romney?
MR. ROMNEY:

Your Honor, I'm going to see if

Cami Cannon is here, or Tracy Wotecki.

We'll call

Sergeant Hodgson.
COURT CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the

testimony you are about to give in this case now
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pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
THE WITNESS:

I do.

GARY HODGSON
having been first duly sworn,
testifies as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ROMNEY:
Q.

Sergeant Hodgson, for the record, state your

name and occupation, please.
A.

Gary Hodgson, I'm a police officer for Provo

City.
Q.

How long have you been working for Provo

City?
A.

Over 13 years.

Q.

You were a police officer, then, in that

capacity on the 13th of March of 1996?
A.

I was.

Q.

Officer, are you familiar with David Cannon?

A.

I am.

Q.

Would you recognize him if he were here?

A.

Yes, he's seated at the defense table next

to Mr. Means.
Q.

How are you familiar with him?

A.

I met him as a result of this investigation.
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Q.

As to this particular incident that the

witnesses have described, Sergeant Hodgson, when did
you become aware of it?
A.

I became aware of it on April the 23rd of

1996.
Q.

How was it that you became aware of it?

A.

Christine Armstrong, along with a couple of

other ladies, came into my office.
Q.

Christine Armstrong is whom as to this case?

A.

The mother of Malcolm Bailey.

Q.

She came into your office accompanied by

whom?
A.

She came in with Penny Cooper and Tracy

Wotecki.
Q.

For what purpose?

A.

To discuss with me some allegations

regarding what they believed to be inappropriate
conduct by Mr. Cannon.
Q.

Did any of those allegations center on the

event described here today?
A.

It did.

Q.

What did you do, Sergeant Hodgson, by way of

your investigation?
A.

I talked with the witnesses pursuant to this

particular victim.

Of course, I couldn't talk to the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

child, he was born in 1995, June the 6th, to be exact.
Q.

So at this event would have been how old?

A.

At this particular time he would have been

nine months, approximately.
Q.

You couldn't talk with the victim, then what

did you do to investigate?
A.

Well, I talked to the witnesses in the case,

also talked to Mr. Cannon.
Q.

After speaking with the witnesses, when was

it that you talked to Mr. Cannon?
A.

Let me refer to my report for the date of

the interview, May the 24th of 1996.
Q.
with him?
A.

What were the circumstances of your visiting
Where was he, where were you?
He came down to my office at the police

department.
Q.

Was he in custody?

A.

He was not.

Q.

Was he advised that he was not?

A.

He was.

Q.

He spoke to you voluntarily?

A.

He did.

Q.

Did you discuss this incident that we've

talked about here this morning?
A.

We did.
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Q.

What in particular?

A.

Specifically regarding what the allegations

were regarding this particular case.
Q.

What did you tell him as to what they were?

A.

Well, we discussed -- as I recall, I told

him that there was allegations that there had been
some inappropriate conduct with Ms. Armstrong's
children, further on this particular case that there
was an allegation that he had placed a young child in
danger.
Q.

Did you describe what you knew about it, the

circumstances?
A.

As we continued through the interview I did.

Q.

Did you invite his response?

A.

I did.

Q.

What did he say?

A,

To the best of my knowledge he denied any

type of activity as he had been accused of.
Q.

You had conducted an investigation by

talking to the witnesses; is that correct?
A.

I had.

Q.

At the conclusion of that, your

investigation into the incident and talking with Mr.
Cannon, did you prefer charges against Mr. Cannon?
A.

I screened the case with yourself, and
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charges were filed, yes.
Q.

For what?

A.

Child abuse.

Q.

Based on what facts that you had available

to you?
A.

Based on the fact that by his actions of

hanging the victim over the railing of the apartment
complex, that he had placed the child in imminent
danger of physical abuse -- or physical danger,
physical injury.
Q.

Did you conduct any other investigation into

this case?
A.

For what circumstances?

Q.

As to the incident that we've described here

today?
A.

Not that I recall.
MR. ROMNEY: Thank. you, that's all the

questions I have of Sergeant Hodgson, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Mr. Means?

MR. MEANS: No questions, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, sir.
Anything else, Mr. Romney?
MR. ROMNEY:

If I could just have a moment,

your Honor.
THE COURT: Sure.
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1
2

MR. ROMNEY:

That's the extent of the

testimony that we have, your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

Mr. Means?

4

MR. MEANS:

Ygur Honor, I'm going to move

5

that the Court issue an order or acquittal based on

6

the evidence you've heard so far, without need for the

7

defendant to put on a defense.

8
9

The reason I'm going to do that is that he's
been charged with an offense that under Section 76-5-

10

109, which says that he is charged with "intentionally

11

and knowingly inflicting a physical injury upon

12

Malcolm Bailey, or having the care and custody of that

13

child, caused or permitted another to inflict physical

14

injury upon the child," and you've had no evidence

15

whatsoever of any physical injury.

16
17

MR. ROMNEY:

May I respond to that, your

Honor?

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. ROMNEY:

Yes, sir.
Definitionally in the Section

20

76-5-109 (1) (b) subsection (4) -- first in the

21

proceeding subsection defines physical injury as a

22

condition which impairs physical -- "an injury to or

23

condition of the child impairing physical condition,

24

including a bruise, a laceration, an abrasion, failure

25

to thrive or malnutrition, or" -- and this is the
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subsection we are going under -- "any other condition
which imperils the child's health or welfare,,! and
which is not a serious physical injury is defined in
this section.
Certainly the holding of a child --a nine
month old child over a railing 2 0 or 3 0 feet above the
ground constitutes that condition imperiling a child's
health or welfare.

There can be no other

interpretation than that makes statutorily what is
defined here.
We submit that in fact that's what has been
testified to, and that does constitute child abuse or
physical injury -- it's a physical injury component of
child abuse as defined by the legislature in this
statute.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. MEANS:

If I could, your Honor, I think

(inaudible) defining words define injury, not
circumstances, they define a condition to the child,
not the overall circumstances surrounding his conduct.
He hasn't inflicted an injury which is either a
bruise, a laceration, an abrasion, or some other
injury which imperils the child's physical condition.
Not the created circumstances which might have
imperiled the child's physical condition, but there
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has to be a result (inaudible) injury (inaudible).
THE COURT:

Well, as I read the statute, I

find that physical injury as defined in subsection (4)
of that paragraph, as Mr. Romney has referred to it,
as any other condition which imperils, and the other
condition in this instance may well be the condition
of placing the child over the railing, which would
imperil the child's health or welfare.

That is a

factor of the physical injury as defined by the
statue.

I'm going to deny your motion.
MR. MEANS:

Can I have just a minute, your

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

MR. MEANS:

We'd rest, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Honor?

Anything from either side?
MR. ROMNEY:

Your Honor, I think we'll

submit it.
THE COURT:

Anything else, Mr. Means?

MR. MEANS:

Submit it.

THE COURT:

Based upon the testimony before

me, I find the defendant guilty of the charge of child
abuse, a class A misdemeanor, as set forth in 76-5109.

I find that the activity of the defendant with

respect to the minor child that has been testified to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25

created a condition which imperiled the child's health
or welfare, which under the section, would be defined
as a physical injury.
Under that section the penalty imposed could
be that of a class A misdemeanor, which has been the
charge filed in the crime against Mr. Cannon.
Comments?
MR. ROMNEY:

You haven't arrived at

sentencing, your Honor.

When you get there may I

(inaudible)?
THE COURT:
MR. ROMNEY:

I'm there.
Your Honor, in speaking with

Sergeant Hodgson -- and I'm looking at Mr. Cannon's
criminal history --he was charged in May of 1996 with
rape of a child, and speaking with the sergeant, the
judicial resolution shows none or no information
available.

I had to rely on Sergeant Hodgson, whose

recollection is that he is on probation for that. I
believe he's been convicted either of that or a lesser
charge.

I think it's appropriate that he be referred

to AP&P for presentence report.
THE COURT:

I intend to make the referral,

thank you.
Mr. Means, would you and your client come
forward, please?
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MR. MEANS:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Mr. Means, would you discuss

with your client on the record the necessity to
continue sentencing for the purpose of the referral?
MR. MEANS:

Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Cannon, you have a right to be sentenced
no sooner than two days from today, no longer than 45
days from today.

The Court has indicated that he

desires that you participate in a presentence
evaluation.

You might have done one of those before.

If you have, you know that that may take longer than
45 days.
MR. CANNON:
MR. MEANS:

All right.
Do you consent that your

sentencing can be pronounced at a time longer than 45
days from today?
MR. CANNON: Yes.
MR. MEANS:

We'll waive it, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

I find that the

defendant has agreed to have sentencing continued and
waives the opportunity of immediate sentence.
I'm going to refer Mr. Cannon to the Adult
Probation and Parole office in Provo, Utah, for the
purpose of participating in the preparation of a
presentence report that will be submitted to this
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Court.

Sentencing is set for what date?
COURT CLERK:

February 23rd at 9 o'clock.

THE COURT: Nine a.m. on that date of 2/23,
Mr. Cannon, you are to be present.

You are to contact

the Adult Probation and Parole office within seven
days of today's date.

Please cooperate with them

fully.
For your information, if you fail to
participate with them as you need to, and I get a
report back saying that the report is not ready
because you failed to cooperate, then I'll place you
in custody until we get the report done and until the
sentencing is taken care of.

You understand?

MR. CANNON: Yes.
THE COURT: All right, sign your promise to
appear right here on the document that the clerk has,
and then you're free to go.
MR. ROMNEY:

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MEANS: Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Means.
(Hearing concluded)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF UTAH

I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed
under my direction from the electronic tape recording
made of these proceedings.
That this transcript is full, true, and correct
and contains all of the evidence, all of the
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all
matters to which the same relate which were audible
through said tape recording.
I further certify that I am not interested in the
outcome thereof.
That certain parties were not identified in the
record, and therefore the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the
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February 24, 2000
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